The FAA has ordered repeated flight control system tests on certain Boeing 737NG aircraft because faulty or missing spoiler position data could stop an autothrottle safeguard from activating. The directive, AD 2026-23-04, affects about 300 US-registered aircraft. It covers selected 737-600, 737-700, 737-700C, 737-800 and 737-900 jets. It was scheduled for publication on November 20, 2026, and is due to take effect 15 days after publication.
The safeguard, known as the cruise thrust split monitor (MONFD), is designed to disconnect the autothrottle when a large difference between the two engines’ thrust threatens the aircraft’s lateral stability. When one engine produces much more thrust than the other, the aircraft tends to yaw and roll. The autopilot can initially counter those movements through the ailerons and flight spoilers, which may make the imbalance harder to notice.
The monitor uses flight control data, including spoiler position. If the spoiler data are missing or incorrect, the monitor may fail to disconnect the autothrottle. If the autothrottle remains engaged despite an existing thrust imbalance, the aircraft could enter an uncommanded roll. If the crew does not notice and correct the situation, the crew could lose control of the aircraft. The problem could go unnoticed during normal operations because the monitor is only needed under certain conditions.
The directive requires repeated aileron built-in test equipment (BITE) checks of the digital flight control system under Boeing’s advisory. If a check finds a failure, operators must fix it and repeat the test until it passes. The FAA estimates about $170 per aircraft per test, excluding repairs. The directive does not require immediate hardware replacement. The FAA issued it without its usual advance comment period due to the safety concern, but will accept comments for 45 days after publication.
The FAA issued earlier directives concerning the monitor on certain 737 Classic aircraft. In the 2021 crash of Sriwijaya Air Flight 182, a 737-500, Indonesian investigators found that mechanical friction or binding prevented the autothrottle from reducing thrust on the right engine while thrust on the left continued to decrease. They concluded that an underestimated spoiler-position signal delayed the monitor’s activation. The new 737NG directive does not cite that crash or establish that the affected jets have the same underlying defect.
